

Message Text

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C O N F I D E N T I A L MADRID 869

LIMDIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (TEXT)

E.O. 11652 GDS

TAGS: PBOR, SP, MO

SUBJECT: IMPLICATION FOR SPANISH FOREIGN POLICY OF
MOROCCAN DRIVE FOR ENCLAVES

REF MADRID 825

1. WHILE LONG EXPECTED, MOROCCAN APPEAL AT UN FOR
DECOLONIZATION OF SPANISH ENCLAVES ON NORTH AFRICAN COAST HAS
STUNNED SPANISH AND CONFRONTED THEM WITH SERIOUS NEW CHALLENGE
WITH POSSIBLE FAR-REACHING IMPLICATIONS FOR THEIR FOREIGN POLICY.
MUCH DEPENDS OF COURSE ON WHETHER MOROCCAN INITIATIVE IS SUPPORTED
BY UN COMMITTEE OF 24 AND BECOMES ONGOING ISSUE. IF ISSUE IS
FILED AWAY OR PLACED ON BACK BURNER FOR STUDY, SPANISH, WHO ALREADY
CONFRONTED WITH PLETHORA OF OTHER FOREIGN POLICY AND DOMESTIC
PROBLEMS, WOULD PROBABLY COOL OFF SOMEWHAT THOUGH SUSPICIONS
WOULD REMAIN HIGH. HOWEVER, IF MOROCCANS PRESS ISSUE, AND PART-
ICULARLY IF THEY ACCOMPANY DIPLOMATIC MANEUVERS BY PHYSICAL
PRESSURES ON ENCLAVES THEMSELVES, SPANISH GOVT MAY BE EXPECTED
TO REACT FAR MORE AGGRESSIVELY THAN IT HAS IN CASE OF MOROCCAN
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PRESSURES IN SAHARA. THREATS TO CEUTA AND MELILLA QUITE CAPABLE

OF AROUSING IRRIDENTIST PASSIONS SO FAR UNKNOWN IN SPANISH PUBLIC RESPONSE ON SAHARA ISSUE.

2. IF MOROCCAN INITIATIVE IS PRESSURE TACTIC IN SUPPORT OF SAHARAN QUEST, WE DOUBT SPANISH WILL REACT WITH ANY GREATER WILLINGNESS TO SATISFY MOROCCAN CLAIMS TO SHARA. ON CONTRARY, MORE LIKELY EFFECT WOULD BE INCREASE SPAIN'S DETERMINATION TO SEEK DECOLONIZATION OF SAHARA THROUGH TO INDEPENDENCE WITH LESS, NOT MORE, REGARD TO MOROCCAN INTERESTS. SPAIN'S LINE ON SAHARA WILL BECOME EVEN FIRMER IF MOROCCANS, IN THEIR DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY, LINK HERETOFORE SEPARATE SAHARA AND ENCLAVES ISSUES IN SINGLE DIPLOMATIC CAMPAIGN.

3. SPANISH HAVE ALREADY INDICATED THEIR AWARENESS OF VULNERABILITY OF THEIR POSITION ON ENCLAVES IN UN, WHERE THEY SUSPECT MOROCCO'S ARAB FRIENDS AND THIRD WORLD BLOC WILL BE LITTLE IMPRESSED BY SPAIN'S WELL REASONED HISTORICAL ARGUMENTS BACKING UP ITS RIGHTS TO ENCLAVES. VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE TO CONCEIVE AT THIS POINT OF ANY SPANISH GOVT HEEDING UN RULING TO "DECOLONIZE" ENCLAVES. SPANISH TAKE PRIDE IN THEIR RECORD OF CLOSE ADHERENCE TO UN RESOLUTIONS AND WE EXPECT THEY WILL WAGE PAINSTAKING PARLIAMENTARY BATTLE IN ALL UN FORUMS POSSIBLE TO BEAT DOWN MOROCCAN MANEUVER BY LEGAL MEANS. BUT IF THAT FAILS, LIKELIHOOD IS THAT SPAIN WILL REGRETFULLY OPT TO JOIN LIST OF COUNTRIES WHO HAVE SIMPLY DISREGARDED UN'S RULINGS. SIMILARLY, AS IN CASE OF SAHARA DISPUTE, SPANISH WILL MANEUVER ASSIDUOUSLY TO PREVENT ARAB STATES FROM UNIFYING IN SUPPORT OF MOROCCAN CLAIMS. THIS TASK MAY BE SOMEWHAT MORE DIFFICULT FOR SPAIN IN CASE OF ENCLAVES, AS COMPARED TO SAHARA, AS THERE APPARENTLY EXISTS NO DIVERSITY OF INTERESTS AMONG NORTH AFRICAN ARAB STATES OVER ENCLAVES. IF MOROCCO SUCCEEDS IN MAKING ITS CASE AN ARAB-WIDE CAUSE, ISSUE ULTIMATELY COULD ERODE SPAIN'S FOREIGN POLICY FUNDAMENTAL OF FRIENDSHIP WITH THE ARAB WORLD.

4. SPANISH HAVE UNTIL NOW MAINTAINED THAT THEY SHARE OBJECTIVE OF PRESERVING MODERATE HASSAN REGIME IN MOROCCO, LARGELY BECAUSE OF FEAR THAT HE PROBABLY WOULD BE REPLACED BY MORE RADICAL NATIONALISTIC REGIME THAT WOULD THREATEN SPAIN'S NORTH AFRICAN INTERESTS. NOW, FACT IS THAT SPAIN CONSIDERS PROTECTION OF ENCLAVES A MAJOR NORTH AFRICAN INTEREST, AND HASSAN HIMSELF HAS

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THREATENED IT. WHILE SPANISH WILL BE WATCHING HASSAN'S FOLLOW-UP ACTIONS CLOSELY ON ISSUE, QUITE POSSIBLE SPAIN'S VESTIGAL SUPPORT FOR MONARCHY, WHICH ALREADY PASSIVE AT BEST, WILL VANISH IF HASSAN PERSISTS.

5. ENCLAVES ISSUE WILL PROBABLY IMPINGE ON SPAIN'S RELATIONS WITH US. SPANISH FOREIGN OFFICE AND MILITARY OFFICIALS HAVE REACTED VERY NEGATIVELY TO US PROVISION OF ARMS TO MOROCCO, SAYING THAT

WILL UPSET MILITARY BALANCE IN AFRICA AND ADVERSELY AFFECT ATTITUDES IN CURRENT BASE NEGOTIATIONS. IT MIGHT BE ARGUED THAT SPAIN'S EXPRESSIONS OF CONCERN OVER US ARMS SALES TO MOROCCO DURING SAHARA DISPUTE ALTHOUGH STRIDENT, NOT SO STRONGLY BASED AS TO BE LASTING. INSERTION OF ENCLAVES ISSUE INTO CURRENT SPANISH-MOROCCO DISPUTE RAISES STAKES GREATLY AS FAR AS SPANISH ARE CONCERNED, AND ACCORDINGLY MAY MEAN THAT SPANISH BITTERNESS OVER US ARMS SUPPLY WILL BECOME BOTH MORE INTENSE AND MORE DEEPLY ROOTED.

6. INITIAL COMMENTS OF SPANISH OFFICIALS SUGGEST THAT WE MAY BE ACCUSED OF UNWITTINGLY HAVING STIMULATED AGGRESSIVE MOROCCAN DRIVE BY SIGNALLING ENCOURAGEMENT WITH DECISIONS TO SELL ARMS AND TO SUPPORT MOROCCAN POSITION AT UNGA. IN RESPONDING TO SPANISH SUSPICIONS DURING SAHARA DISPUTE, WE HAVE REPEATEDLY ASSERTED OUR NEUTRALITY. THIS ARGUMENT WAS ADEQUATE IN THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES THOUGH SPANISH OFFICIALS OCCASIONALLY QUESTIONED HOW US COULD BE NEUTRAL IN CONFLICT INVOLVING FRIENDLY STATE TO WHOM IT TIED BY DEFENSE AGREEMENT AND JOINT DELCARATION. WITH WHAT SPANISH SEE AS NATIONAL INTEGRITY AT STAKE, IT IS DOUBTFUL THAT US ARGUMENTS COUCHED IN TERMS OF MERE NEUTRALITY WILL NOW BE WELL RECEIVED BY THE SPANISH. WE MUST ASSUME THAT SUCH SPANISH ANXIETIES WILL BE VENTED IN SOME, PERHAPS VERY STRONG, WAY IN THE CURRENT BASE NEGOTIATIONS AND OF COURSE COULD IMPINGE HEAVILY ON ANY JOINT EFFORT TO DEFINE MUTUAL AREAS OF INTEREST FOR DEFENSE PURPOSES.

7. AT SAME TIME, NEW MOROCCAN PRESSURES WILL HEIGHTEN SPAIN'S EXISTING SENSE OF ISOLATION AND INSECURITY AROUND ITS PERIPHERY TO A DEGREE. THIS FEELING MAY COUNTER-BALANCE TO SOME EXTENT THE ANTI-US ANIMUS GROWING OUT OF OUR BEHAVIOR SO FAR IN THE DISPUTE AND STRENGTHEN SPAIN'S UNDERLYING

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DESIRE TO CONTINUE SOME FORM OF DEFENSE FELATIONSHIP WITH THE US, PROVIDED THE WE END UP BEING SUFFICIENTLY RESPONSIVE.
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